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became law subsequent to the commencement of the Branch case. Under
this law the conservation commission is permitted to make certain state
aid available to counties and towns upon their passing a resolution indicating their desire to acquire and improve lands for public access to
navigable lakes or streams in their county or town. The commission
must find that the project will best serve the public interest and the
need of the state as a whole.1 8 There are, however, limitations in that
cities are not eligible for this aid, nor may a county or town receive aid
'to improve existing accesses which they already own.
Through this decision construing Section 23.09(14) and in view of
more recent Section 23.09(15), it appears that Wisconsin has wholeheartedly adopted a policy of promoting public access to navigable
waters. The condemnation power and the offer of financial assistance
under certain circumstances may instill a desire in county boards to
develop public accesses and recreational facilities in their respective
areas. On the other band the riparian landowner seems to be fighting
a losing battle in view of the manifested state policy. His defenses appear limited to situations where the taking of land is pursuant to the
arbitrary action of the condemning authority.
Perhaps the most significant point of this decision concerns the
subject of damages. The benefit which the landowner receives in excluding the public by virtue of his ownership of land surrounding the
lake will not be considered by the court as a property right. Thus, such
personal benefit will not enter into a "before the taking" valuation and
cannot be compensated for as an element of damages.'
JERRY

D. GULL

Wills-Liability of Attorney to an Intended Beneficiary for Negligent Drafting of a Will: Robert Lucas alleged in his complaint
that defendant L. S. Hamm, an attorney at law, had agreed with testator,
Eugene Emmich, to prepare a will and codicils for him by which
plaintiffs were to be beneficiaries of a trust provided for in the will and
to receive 15% of the residue. The instruments provided that the "trust
shall cease and terminate at 12 o'clock on a day five years after the date
upon which the order distributing the trust property to the trustee is
made by the court having jurisdiction over the probation of this will."
The defendant attorney, who was also counsel for the executors, advised plaintiffs, after the death of testator and admission of the will to
probate, that the trust provision was invalid and advised plaintiffs to
make a settlement with the blood relatives of the testator. Plaintiffs
allege that the attorney's negligent drafting, which violated the statu18 49 A.G. 141-142.
19

Branch v. Oconto County, supra note 1, at 602, 109 N.W. 2d at 109.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

tory laws relating to restraints on alienation and the rule against perpetuities,' resulted in a loss of $75,000 to them. Defendant attorney's
demurrer was sustained and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court of
California upheld the trial court's decision, Lucas v. Hamm, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 821, 364 P. 2d 685 (1961), but stated that an attorney could be
liable in both tort and contract to an intended beneficiary who did not
receive the benefit because of the attorney's negligent drafting of the
will.
The Court expressly overruled Buckley v. Gray.2 The Lucas case
held, however, that under the facts the attorney did not breach the
standard of conduct requiring the skill, prudence, and diligence as
lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly exercise,3 since the
area of rules against perpetuities is a "technicality-ridden legal nightmare. ' 4 The invalidity of the provision of the will might occur because
of the remote possibility that the order of distribution of the probate
court would be delayed to a period exceeding that provided for by the
rules against berpetuities; but the Supreme Court decided that as a
matter of law the attorney had not breached the standard of conduct,
because an attorney of ordinary skill acting under the same circumstances might well have failed to recognize the danger.5
Prior to the Lucas decision, the almost universally accepted view
was that some form of privity was necessary for an attorney's liability
to a third person (not his client) for mere negligence rather than fraud,
collusion, malicious or intentionally tortious conduct. 6 The basic reason
for refusal to'extend liability appears to be that "There would be no
bounds to actions and litigious intricacies if the ill effects of the negligence of men may be followed down the chain of results to the final
effect.'"7 To extend an attorney's liability to persons not in privity
"would make the practice of law one of such financial hazard that few
men would care to incur the risk of its practice." 8 The "good faith" of
the attorney's actions is a criterion which outweighs the financial loss to
a third person not a clientf The courts have generally held that no
duty is owed by an attorney to act with reasonable care, skill, and diligence toward anyone except his client.' 0
I Cal Civil Code §715.2 and former §§715.1 and 716.
2110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895).
3Lucus v. Hamm, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P. 2d 685 (1961).
4Id., at 690, citing Leach, PerpetuitiesLegislation, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1349 (1954).
5 Supra note 3, 364 P. 2d at 690.
65 Aar. JUR. Attorneys at Law §147 (1936) ; 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §52

(1937).

7National
Saving Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 202 (1880).
8
Rose v. Davis, 288 Ky. 674, 157 S.W. 2d 284, 285 (1941).
9 Kasen v. Morrell, 18 Misc. 2d 158, 183 N.Y.S. 2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
10 So implanted is the concept of privity as a requirement for an attorney's
liability that one court found, through strained interpretation, that the disappointed beneficiary under a negligently drawn will was actually the client of
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Lucas v. Hamm is a breakthrough in the solid "citadel of privity"
concept of attorney's liability for negligence. However, its result is not
too startling in view of the law's growing relaxation of a demand for
privity between an alleged tort feasor and the injured party. Liability
has been imposed on manufacturers whose goods if negligently made
are reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril." This has been
extended to liability for damage to tangible property,' 2 as well as where
the only risk of harm has been to an intangible interest.'3 The California Supreme Court in Biankanja v. Irving 4 placed liability upon a
notary public to an intended beneficiary, where the notary public's
negligence consisted in a failure to have the will properly attested. This
decision was not based on the notary's unlicensed practice of law, as
the court reiterated in the Lucas case the negligence factors that had
been approved in Biankanja v. Irving. 5
The court in the Lucas case held that an intended beneficiary of a
negligently drawn will could also recover as a third-party beneficiary
since the intent of the promisee (testator) was to benefit the persons
named in the will.16 Sixty-six years before, the California Court said
in Buckley v. Gray that the contract with the attorney was merely one
of employment and the promisee's intent was merely to make disposition of her estate in accordance with her desire. Third persons were
only incidentally or remotely benefited.' Has the testator's intention, in
approximately a half century, become more benevolent? Perhaps, the
California Court has finally recognized the real reason why a person
employs an attorney to draw a will-to confer benefit upon some third
person at testator's death. The underlying policy now appears to be
that justice demands that the negligent attorney should bear the loss,
rather than the innocent beneficiary. Former fears of a flood of litigation and the burden upon the profession are disregarded.
If a suit of this type is brought on a theory of contract rather than
the scrivener. Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 Pac. 265 (1930);
Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P. 2d 164 (1958).
"1 Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
12 Cohan v. Associated Fur Farm, 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W. 2d 788 (1952).
's Glanzer v. Shepard 223 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). But, liability to third
persons not in privity for negligence has not generally been extended where
the third person is not specifically known or identified. Ultramares Corporation
v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
1449 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P. 2d 16 (1958).
15 In restating the rule it was said that the determination whether in a specific
case the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a
matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which
are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,
the forseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between defendant's conduct
and the injury and the policy of preventing future harm, Lucas v. Hamm,
supra note 3, 364 P. 2d at 687.
16 Lucas v. Hamm, supra note 3, 364 P. 2d at 689.
17 Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900, 902 (1895).
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tort, the damages recoverable may not be the same and a different statute of limitations may apply.1s Third-party beneficiary contract actions
are usually based on strict liability rather than a negligence standard
for performance. However, in the present type of situation the attorney
only "impliedly agrees to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in
the performance of the tasks which they undertake."' 19 The beneficiary's
position under the contract is not any better than that of the promisee.
A problem arises when the question is asked whether Wisconsin
would adopt the third-party beneficiary theory of recovery. The general
view is that the promisee's intent to benefit the third person is necessary, and that the promisor's intent (which is usually to get the promisee's consideration) is immaterial."0 This is also the position of Vrooman v. Turner,21 which the Wisconsin court purportedly relies on in
Rowe v.Moon.22 The court, however, substitutes the promisor's intent
for that of the prontisee's as controlling, as well as declaring that some
privity must exist between the promisor and the third party, whereas
the Vrooman decision required privity between the promisee and the
24
2
third party. " The Wisconsin Court would probably have to clarify

or disapprove the language in the Rowe case before giving an intended
beneficiary a third-party beneficiary claim against an attorney as promisor, since it could hardly be said that the scrivener intended to confer
25
a benefit upon the intended beneficiary.
The possibility of tort liability for an attorney in Wisconsin would
seemingly be contra to the decision of Peterson v. Gales. 2 6 A beneficiary

of a will, however, is known to the attorney who prepares the instrument, in contrast to the Peterson case where the abstract company did
The Statute of Limitations for a contract action is usually for a greater period
than that for a tort action (generally 6 years as opposed to 3 years) 49 A.L.R.
2d 1216 (1956).
19Supra note 17. Accord, Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12
VAND. L. REv. 755 (1959); 5 Am. JUR. Attorneys at Law §124 (1936);
Wlodarek v. Thrift, 178 Md. 453, 13 A. 2d 774 (1940).
2o RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrS §133, 1(a) and 1 (b) (1932); 4 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS
18

§776 (1951) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS §357 (3rd ed. 1959).

2169 N.Y. 280, 25 Am. Rep. 195 (1877).
(This case has never been cited in any
22 115 Wis. 566, 92 N.W. 263 (1902).
subsequent decision.)
23 The privity requirement was probably answered in Tweedale v. Tweedale, 116
Wis. 517, 93 N.W. 440 (1903) in which privity was established by law and
which gave a donee beneficiary a "vested right" before acquiring knowledge of
the contract.
24 This could be done by viewing the promisor's intent as objectively intending
the natural and probable consequences of the promised act, rather than the
promisor's subjective intent.
25 The California Court did this in Lucas v. Hamm, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364, P.
2d 685 at 689 (1961).
26 191 Wis. 137, 210 N.W. 407 (1926), wherein an abstract company which prepared an abstract for the grantor was not liable to the grantee for failure to
disclose a restrictive covenant, because of the absence of privity of contract.
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know the grantee. The attorney's standard of conduct would probably also require clarification, since in Malone v.Gerth, an action by a
client against his attorney, a somewhat variable test was proposed:
If an attorney is fairly capacitated to discharge the duties ordinarily incumbent upon one of his profession, and acts with a
proper degree of attention and with reasonable care, and to the
and knowledge, he will not be responsible. [Embest of his skill
27
phasis added]

Once a court removes the requirement of privity for tort liability
or adopts a liberal view of third-party beneficiary doctrine, only the case
by case method of determining the limits of liability for attorneys, and
other professions, will allow one to state the law with any amount of
certainty. Lawyers may protest this increased imposition of liability,
attorney liability insurance may increase both in rates and coverage, but
the possible value to the profession, if attorneys are aware of this
greater liability, is an advantage to the profession which should not be
quickly dismissed.
At present it would be too speculative to predict whether the California attorney 1.) will exercise a greater degree of care or 2.) show
restraint in adopting new methods 28 or 3.) continue to practice in the
same manner as he did prior to Lucas v. Harem.
ALLAN E. IDING
Wills-Pouring Over into Testamentary Trust of Another: A
mother and her son planned and drafted together her last will dated
May 2, 1946, and his will dated May 3, 1946. The draft of the latter will
was in existence on the date the former will was executed. According
to a trust provision in the mother's will, one-half of the trust assets were
left "to my son's trust estate, which is willed to charities including those
of my choosing."' She died testate on November 19, 1947. The son later
revoked his will and made a subsequent will dated February 14, 1958,
which omitted all charities. He died testate on January 4, 1959. On
September 11, 1959, the executors of the son's will filed a petition to
construe the final judgement in the mother's estate for the purpose of
determining whether any assets in the mother's estate should be inventoried in the son's estate. Held: the will by which testatrix made a beWis. 166, 75 N.W. 972 (1898). This statement of the standard of care has
been interpreted, however, as merely requiring ordinary skill and care as com-

27 100

monly possessed and exercised by attorneys in that jurisdiction. 45 A.L.R. 2d
12 (1956).
28It has been asserted that California physicians and surgeons have resorted to
the use of expensive precautions unnecessary for treatment but rather as a
legal precaution, have refrained from the use of new drugs, and have been
reluctant to employ novel techniques because of the impact of malpractice
litigation and high jury awards in that state. The California Malpractice Controversy, 9 STAN. L. REv. 731 (1956).
'Estate of Brandenburg, 13 Wis. 2d 217, 222, 108 N.W. 2d 374, 376 (1961).

